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Abstract 
Physical time-charters (TC) and Forward Freight Agreements (FFAs) represent two hedging 
approaches that differ in terms of risks and physical access to transportation.  We investigate the 
determinants of the time-varying TC-FFA freight rate differential in the dry bulk market.  We 
find that TC and FFA prices are co-integrated but TC rates are generally priced higher than FFAs. 
The differential is explained by the level and slope of the term structure, a measure of economic 
‘stress’ as well as vessel specifications and contractual terms. Finally, the TC-FFA differential 
is related to default risk premium and the potential convenience yield. 
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1. Introduction 
Agents and participants in the international shipping market have developed and utilised different 
types of contracts and tools to control freight market risk. These include long-term period 
timecharter contracts, contracts of affreightments and, more recently, freight derivative contracts 
such as forward freight agreements (FFA) and freight options.1 The main difference between 
physical and financial contracts relates to flexibility and access to transportation. Physical 
contracts such as time charters ensure access to a transportation service and a vessel, but they are 
not flexible because the underlying vessel cannot be changed, their termination could be costly, 
and they are bilateral contracts that are subject to default or counterparty risk. FFA contracts are 
flexible in terms of trading and have virtually no default risk when they are cleared, but they do 
not provide access to a vessel or transportation service. Nevertheless, both period and FFA 
contracts are used for managing spot freight rate exposure by shipowners and charterers.  
A large body of the literature has been devoted to investigating different aspects of the FFA and 
physical market including Kavussanos and Visvikis (2004a and 2004b), Kavussanos, Visvikis 
and Menachof (2004), Kavussanos, Visvikis and Batchelor (2004), Batchelor et al. (2007), 
Alizadeh (2013), among others (see Section 2). For instance, Kavussanos, Visvikis and 
Menachof (2004) investigate the unbiasedness of FFA prices in relation to determination of 
future spot rates and conclude that forward freight rates are unbiased predictors of spot freight 
rates.  Other studies such as Kavussanos and Visvikis (2004a and 2010) and Alizadeh et al. 
(2015) focus on evaluating hedging performance and the interaction between FFA and spot rates. 
They use different hedging techniques including constant and time-varying hedge ratios when 
hedging spot freight market exposure with FFAs. The general finding here is that the hedging 
performance of FFAs is substantially worse than for other commodity and financial markets, a 
                                                 
1 The forward freight agreement (FFA) contracts were developed and evolved over time to enable agents involved 
in international shipping to manage risks that arise from fluctuations in freight rates (see Kavussanos and Visvikis, 
2004 and Alizadeh and Nomikos, 2009) and vessel prices (Alizadeh and Nomikos, 2012). A FFA is defined as a 
cash-settled contract between two counterparties to settle a freight rate for a specified quantity of cargo or hire rate 
for a type of vessel in one (or a basket) of the major shipping routes in the dry bulk, tanker and container shipping 
sectors for a specified future time period. The underlying asset of the FFA contracts can be any of the routes (or 
basket of routes) that constitute the freight indices produced mainly by the Baltic Exchange or by other providers of 
freight market information (see Kavussanos and Visvikis, 2006 and Alizadeh and Nomikos, 2009, for a full 
description of FFAs and their applications for hedging). 
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fact which is typically attributed to the non-storable nature of spot freight rates and the 
corresponding lack of a cost-of-carry relationship between spot and forward prices. 
These early studies (Kavussanos and Visvikis, 2004a and b, and Kavussanos, Visvikis and 
Menachof, 2004) were undertaken at a point in the dry bulk FFA market development where the 
most active contracts were related to individual routes such that the hedging of spot exposure 
was indeed the modus operandi. Within the past decade, such contracts have effectively ceased 
trading, with liquidity now focused on longer FFA contracts (quarters or calendar years) settled 
on a global weighted average spot rate per vessel size, the Baltic TC averages (Adland and Jia, 
2017). The hedging of freight market exposure using such FFA contracts is, by definition, more 
akin to using physical TCs, where owners and operators lock in time-charter-equivalent earnings 
per vessel for a prolonged period of time. 
In this study, we therefore examine, for the first time, the statistical relationship between physical 
TC and FFAs. While both alternatives lock in a fixed freight rate for a defined period, the two 
approaches carry very different types of risks.  Firstly, a time-charter (TC) is a physical contract 
that gives the charterer commercial control over a vessel and access to a transportation service, 
while a FFA contract is a purely financial cash-settled contract for the difference between a Baltic 
Index and the agreed contract rates.  If secure access to transportation has value (a “convenience 
yield”) then we would expect that TCs are, on average, priced higher than FFA contracts for the 
same ship size and period.  We would also expect that this differential is positively related to the 
state of the freight market, because secure access to transportation will have a lower value 
(convenience) during periods of oversupply of ships and low freight rates.  This is a general 
concept for the forward pricing function in commodity markets, where the underlying asset is 
storable and the marginal convenience yield is a decreasing function of stocks held (Brennan, 
1958). 
Secondly, there are multiple potential sources of cash flow differences (basis risks) due, for 
instance, to a) different vessel specifications between the physical vessel and the standard Baltic 
type vessel underlying FFA contracts, b) different trading patterns of the physical ship, c) higher 
default risk for a single charterer in a TC than the clearing houses standing behind FFA contracts 
and d) timing differences in the start and end-dates of the contracts, particularly when TC 
contracts have embedded extension options.  These sources of risk are likely to be time-varying 
and dependent on market conditions and the financial standing of the charterer. 
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Our paper has three primary objectives. Firstly, we want to assess whether there is a (potentially 
time varying) differential between TC rates and corresponding FFA prices.  We assess this 
relationship by comparing the standardized fixed-duration TC rates as supplied by shipbrokers 
and the FFA prices for an equivalent duration.  Secondly, we want to assess whether such 
differential is caused by known differences in risks and cash flows (e.g. different vessel 
specifications).  Thirdly, we want to evaluate whether the differential is dependent on freight 
market conditions such that it can be interpreted as a convenience yield in the physical forward 
market.  For the latter two research questions, we evaluate the differential between realized 
individual TC fixtures in the dry bulk market and the FFA price for the corresponding period.   
Addressing the above questions are important for several reasons. First, from a theoretical point 
of view, a better understanding of the FFA and time-charter markets and their interaction can be 
used to specify better models and produce more accurate forecasts for these variables. Second, 
from a practical point of view, improved knowledge of the relationship and differences between 
time-charter rates and FFAs can help ship-owners, operators and charterers to assess freight 
trading tactics, formulate better hedging strategies and enhance the efficiency of their risk 
management process.  For instance, market participants can use the information on the difference 
between FFA and TC contracts to determine the value of period contracts (e.g. time-charter or 
contract of affreightment) using FFA curves. Third, shipowners, operators and charterers can use 
the results to assess whether apparent arbitrage opportunities between the physical and “paper” 
forward freight markets are real or simply a result of time-varying risk premia or physical basis 
risks. Fourth, our research is closely related to the important question of default risk in physical 
time-charters. Adland and Jia (2008) show conceptually that default risk is strongly related to 
freight market conditions and contract duration, with longer contracts fixed during strong 
markets at greater risk. By comparing TC rates with “risk free” FFA prices we are able to uncover 
a similar risk profile, supporting earlier results in the literature. Finally, the results reveal 
important information regarding the adjustment of hedge ratios according to vessel and contract 
specific factors when FFAs are used to hedging a vessel’s earnings. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature, 
Section 3 describes our data and methodology, Section 4 contains our empirical results and 
Section 5 discusses the implications of our findings. Section 6 summarises the findings and 
concludes with suggestions for future research. 
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2. Literature review 
The maritime economic literature typically treats pricing in the freight derivatives and physical 
forward markets separately, even though the dynamics of spot freight rates is the main driver of 
both markets. Studies on freight derivatives focus on three main issues: the hedging efficiency 
of the contracts (Thuong and Visscher, 1990; Haralambides, 1992; Kavussanos and Nomikos, 
2000a, 2000b; 2000c; Kavussanos and Visvikis, 2010; Goulas and Skiadopoulos, 2012), price 
discovery and the unbiasedness of forward prices in relation to realized spot rates (e.g. 
Kavussanos and Nomikos, 1999; Kavussanos and Nomikos, 2003, Kavussanos and Visvikis, 
2004a) and causality viz-a-viz spot freight rates (see, Kavussanos et al, 2004a; 2004b; 
Kavussanos and Visvikis, 2004b; Alizadeh et al., 2014).  Performed on both the defunct BIFFEX 
freight futures and the FFA market, these empirical studies broadly conclude that freight 
derivatives have overall poor hedging efficiency, even when allowing for time-varying hedge 
ratios, and represent unbiased forecasts only in the short run (1 – 2 months out).   
A related branch of the literature focuses on the modelling of spot freight markets using 
stochastic models.  Examples are the logarithmic mean reverting process proposed by Tvedt 
(1997), the stochastic partial equilibrium models of Tvedt (2003) and Adland and Strandenes 
(2007) and the non-parametric mean reverting model of Adland and Cullinane (2006).  
Prokopczuck (2010) compares the appropriateness of the one and two factor models proposed 
by Gibson and Schwartz (1990) and Schwartz (1997) for modelling freight rates.  Nomikos et al 
(2013) suggest jump diffusion models that can capture the fat tails of freight rate logarithmic 
returns.  Benth and Koekebakker (2016) further extend these models to account for short-term 
autocorrelation, stochastic volatility and non-Gaussian increments in spot rate log-returns, and 
investigate whether the theoretical forward curves from this model can recreate observed FFA 
curves.  Yin et al (2016) apply Vector Error Correction models (VECM) to investigate the 
interaction between spot and forward rates in the dry bulk market and includes exogenous 
fundamental variables in the model. 
Separately, researchers have investigated the determinants of TC rates at the micro level (i.e. for 
individual fixtures).  Köhn and Thanopoulou (2011) use Generalised Additive models to assess 
the impact of variables such as place of delivery, lead time, charter duration, vessel size and fuel 
consumption in a non-linear framework.  Their empirical results support the notion of price 
differentiation based on vessel quality.  Agnolucci et al (2014) investigate the existence of a 
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freight rate premium for fuel efficiency in the Panamax dry bulk TC market during the period 
2008 – 2012 and find that owners recoup approximately 40% of the fuel savings through higher 
rates.  Adland et al (2017) perform a similar study on the determinants of dry bulk TC rates for 
a much larger sample and find that fuel efficiency is only rewarded in poor market conditions. 
An important issue in this context that is not yet well understood, is the influence of time-varying 
risk premia in forward freight pricing, both for the physical and derivatives markets.  As 
discussed in Kavussanos and Alizadeh (2002) this risk premium is thought to arise because 
operation in the spot and forward markets involves different levels of risk.  Adland and Cullinane 
(2005) present a theoretical argument for rejecting the expectations theory for forward freight 
pricing and argue that the risk premium must be time varying and depend on the state of the 
freight market in a systematic manner.  Adland and Jia (2008) present a conceptual model for 
how TC default risk how charter market default risk will vary with freight market conditions, 
charter duration, and the financial situation of the charterer.  Alizadeh et al (2007) show that 
while the unbiasedness hypothesis holds for implied forward rates in the physical market (that 
is, implied forward rates are unbiased predictors of realized future TC rates), there exists 
chartering strategies that profit from capturing cyclical predictable components in the residual.  
Koekebakker and Adland (2004) investigate the dynamics of the term structure of freight rates 
and its volatility structure. 
Overall, the literature review presented here suggests that that the relationship between spot rates, 
FFA prices and physical time-charter fixtures represents a complex interplay between time-
varying risk premia, volatility structures and basis risk such as differing vessel and contractual 
specifications.  Until now, there has been no attempt at investigating the dynamic relationship 
between forward rates in the physical and freight derivative markets or its determinants.  From 
a theoretical point of view, the two must be co-integrated based on an arbitrage argument.  If 
FFA rates are substantially higher than the TC rate for an equivalent period and ship, a ship-
operator can sell the FFA contract, charter in the vessel on the TC contract and sublet it in the 
spot market or on an index-linked time-charter2.  Conversely, if TC rates are substantially higher 
than FFA prices, a ship-operator can charter in a vessel on an index-linked contract, charter it 
out on a TC and buy the FFA contract.  We note that due to the various sources of basis risk, as 
detailed in Adland and Jia (2017) and Alizadeh and Nomikos (2009), these strategies would not 
                                                 
2 An index-linked time-charter differs from the traditional fixed-rate TC in that the daily rate for the vessel is 
“floating” and follows, typically, the same Baltic index used for the settlement of FFAs. 
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represent arbitrage opportunities in the true sense, but “statistical arbitrage” opportunities where 
the expected profit is positive.  Specifically, Adland and Jia (2017) show that the cash flow from 
physical operation will never mimic that of the spot indices underlying the FFA market, even for 
a large fleet with a geographically diversified trading pattern, due to the lag-effect imposed by 
fixed-rate charters. 
Our paper fills this gap in the literature based on the following three contributions.  Firstly, we 
test whether TC rates and FFA prices are co-integrated as a result of their interchangeable use 
for freight market hedging.  Secondly, we evaluate empirically the dynamics of the differential 
between time series of FFA prices and TC rates, addressing the characteristics of the time-
varying risk premium or convenience yield that this differential represents from a theoretical 
point of view.  Thirdly, we investigate the determinants of the differential for individual fixtures 
by controlling for vessel specifications and contractual terms, shedding light on the importance 
of physical basis risks in this context. 
 
3. Methodology 
According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) and the notion of no arbitrage, the 
discounted cash flows from a time-charter contract and the equivalent FFA contract - which 
covers the duration of the time-charter - should be equal (ignoring, for now, the differences in 
risks). Mathematically, we can write the argument as 
 
(1) 
 
where PtTC  is a P period time-charter rate, 
P
tFFA  is a portfolio of FFA contracts covering P 
period, and rte  is the discount factor.  
In reality, FFAs and physical TCs are close substitutes for freight market hedging, but they are 
not identical in terms of risks and “convenience”. There are at least four key reasons for this. 
First, a physical contract provides secure access to transportation (i.e. effectively commercial 
control over a vessel) while a FFA contract does not. Such a “convenience” should give rise to 
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a premium in TC rates which is higher in strong freight markets when there is potentially scarcity 
of tonnage (Adland and Cullinane, 2005). Second, a time-charter is a bilateral contract with 
inherent counterparty risk, compared to FFAs which are cleared. Adland and Jia (2008) show 
from a theoretical point of view that the TC default risk is higher in strong freight markets and 
for longer duration contracts. However, shipowners tend to do their credit check and due 
diligence work on the counterparty before entering the agreement, select the best and most 
reputable charterers, and avoid charterers with poor credit record. In addition, under a time-
charter contract the payment is made on a fortnightly basis and the shipowner can exercise a lien 
on the cargo in case charterers default, or even terminate the contract in case of default. 
Nevertheless, there is always a counterparty risk and potential financial loss due to default in the 
physical time-charter contract. Third, current and expected market conditions as well as expected 
volatility affect the demand for hedging and speculation (Alizadeh, 2013; Alizadeh et al, 2014) 
and, consequently, the liquidity in each market. Fourth, time-charter and FFA differentials could 
also be related to differences in the specification of the physical asset compared to the standard 
ship used to assess the underlying freight for the FFA contract such as size, age, speed and 
consumption, delivery and redelivery locations, and extension options embedded in physical 
time-charter contracts. 
Consequently, we expect that the TC-FFA price differential reverts towards some (potentially 
time-varying) mean in the long run, resulting in an overall stationary process. This co-integration 
behavior follows from the fact that the two hedging instruments are substitutes. Accordingly, 
large price differentials would affect their relative supply and demand and bring prices back into 
line. 
To statistically test the for the co-integration of the time-charter and FFA rates we employ the 
Johansen (1988) cointegration test and perform Likelihood Ratio tests on the restriction implied 
by the EMH. Let tct represent the log of TC rate at time t and ffat represent the log of the 
equivalent FFA price for the corresponding period.  Then the Johansen cointegration test between 
physical TC rates and FFA prices can be specified as: 
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where tct and ffat represent the log of physical time-charter and FFA rates (for the same maturity) 
at time t, respectively, )( 01211    tt ffatc is the long run cointegrating relation, and 1 and 
2 are the coefficients representing the speed of adjustment to long run equilibrium. While the 
cointegration relation between the physical TC and FFA is a necessary condition for the EMH, 
it is not a sufficient condition (Hakkio and Rush, 1989). To test for equality of TC and FFA, one 
has to further test restrictions on the cointegrating relation which imply one-to-one movement 
between the two series in the long run with no significant spread between the two. In other words, 
the validity of the restriction )0   1    1( 021    on cointegrating vector should also be 
assessed.  
The next step after establishing whether the physical TC and FFA prices are co-integrated, is to 
assess the differential between the two series and its time-varying dynamics.  In the setting where 
both FFA prices and TC rates refer to a standard vessel (i.e. where there are no time-varying 
basis risks due to vessel specifications), we expect the differential to be mean reverting, though 
not necessarily with a zero mean due to the differing sources of risk (and risk premia).  A good 
starting point in our discrete-time framework is an autoregressive-moving-average model with 
added linear terms describing the average – an ARMA-X process.   
Based on the preceding discussion of market practice and maritime economic theory, it seems 
reasonable to postulate that the TC-FFA differential could be related to the following three 
factors which are expected to capture the main sources of risk. The first is the level of the freight 
market, which is expected to incorporate changes in ‘convenience yield’, or transportation 
security, as well as default risk. The second is expectations about the future, as reflected in the 
slope of the term structure of freight rates. The third is the level of uncertainty or risk in the 
general economy, which will affect both counterparty default risk and liquidity risk premia.  
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We therefore specify the following ARMA(p,q)-X process for the logarithmic difference 
between physical time-charter and FFA rates with duration K at time t,                                         
𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑡
𝐾 = ln⁡(𝑇𝐶𝑡
𝐾) − ln⁡(𝐹𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝐾) 
 
𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑡
𝐾 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑇𝐶𝑡
𝐾 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑡
𝑝
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝜀𝑡−𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑡               (3) 
 
where, 𝑙𝑇𝐶𝑡
𝐾is the log of TC rate with duration K at time t, SLt is the slope of the forward curve 
(log difference between Current Quarter and 2 Quarter ahead FFA), and DEFt represents the 
market default premium calculated as the difference between the yield on BBB corporate bonds 
and the yield on the 10-year Treasury bond. We assume DEFt is a proxy for world economic 
conditions and credit risk, henceforth we call this variable default probability3. The optimal 
number of lags (p, q) is determined according to the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion 
(SBIC). 
For the investigation of the differential between realized individual TC fixtures and FFA prices 
we base our variable selection on the recent literature on the determinants of TC rates at the 
micro level.  In particular, we follow Adland et al (2017) and include the following variables in 
a multiple log-linear regression with three sets of variables reflecting vessel-specific, contract-
specific and market variables, respectively: 
 
𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑡,𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖
2 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑊𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖 + 𝛾1𝑇𝐶𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾2𝐿𝐶𝑖       (4) 
+𝛾3𝑂𝑃𝑖 + 𝛾4𝑃𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾5𝐼𝐷𝑖 + 𝜆1𝑆𝐿𝑡 + 𝜆2𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑡 + 𝜆3𝐵𝑃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡,𝑖 
 
                                                 
3 There are different proxies proposed in the literature as market stress and default probability including the Market 
Stress Index published by the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, and the market default likelihood index (MDLI) 
by Andreou (2015). We choose the yield premium of BBB corporate bonds on 1-year Treasury bonds as a proxy for 
general market condition and default risk because it is widely used in the literature (from Chen, Roll and Ross, 1986, 
to Perez-Quiros,and Timmermann, 2002 and Campbell & Diebold, 2012, amongst others),  and the fact that it is a 
simple variable which is publicly available. 
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where AGEi represents the age of the vessel at the time fixture i is reported, DWTi is the 
deadweight carrying capacity, SPi and CONi are the design speed and consumption of the vessel 
in question, TCDi is the duration of the period charter, LCi is the laycan for the fixture, OPi is a 
dummy for the presence of an extension option, PDi is a dummy for Pacific Ocean delivery of 
the vessel at the start of the charter and IDi is a dummy for Indian Ocean delivery. Finally, 
regarding market variables, SLt is the slope of forward curve at time t, DEFt is the market default 
premium at time t when contract i is concluded and BPt is the bunker price at time t.  
Based on our definition of the differential (TCt – FFAt) we know that any vessel- or contract-
specific variable that is expected to affect the TC rate positively also will affect the differential 
with the FFA price positively.  Following the results in Alizadeh and Talley (2011a) and Adland 
et al. (2017), we expect vessel age (specifically, 
2
21 AGEAGE   ) to have a non-linear impact 
– positive for modern vessels and negative for older tonnage.  Vessel size (DWT) and speed (SP) 
are expected to affect the TC rate and the differential positively, as a larger or faster vessel has 
greater earnings potential, all else equal.  The dummies for Pacific (PD) and Indian Ocean (ID) 
delivery should have negative coefficients versus the Atlantic Ocean benchmark as delivery in 
the Atlantic positions the vessel for a higher-paying front-haul voyage.  The extension option 
(OP) is a charterer’s option and so should affect the TC rate and our differential positively.  
Finally, the duration of the charter (TCD) should affect the TC rate negatively, as our sample is 
dominated by a backwardated (downward sloping) term structure of freight rates. 
 
4. Data 
Our study is based on time series of TC rates and individual TC fixtures from Clarkson Research 
(2017).  The weekly time-charter rates are based on brokers’ assessment for a standard vessel 
and reported every Friday.  Our sample covers 6-month and 12-month TC rates for Capesize and 
Panamax vessels over the period 22 July 2005 to 23 December 2016 for a total of 597 
observations.  For Supramax vessels the data cover the period 1 January 2006 to 23 December 
2016.  The sample of individual TC fixtures consists of 779 Capesize transactions, 3,224 
Panamax transactions and 1,377 Supramax transactions covering the same period.  The fixture 
data contains details on technical vessel specifications (DWT, age, design speed, fuel 
12 
 
consumption) and contractual terms for the time-charter (duration, place of delivery, extension 
option etc.). 
The Baltic Exchange provides daily closing prices for the nearest monthly, quarterly and calendar 
year FFA contracts for the corresponding sample period.  As the physical TC rates relate to fixed-
duration contracts commencing on the reporting date we need to create prices for the equivalent 
FFA contract which has the same duration. The FFA equivalent portfolio is constructed using 
the weighted average of FFA prices, where the weights are simply the remaining days of the 
current quarter and counting the days of the next quarters to cover the same time period as the 
TC contract. For instance, on 15 April 2010, a 6-month FFA equivalent of a 6-month time-charter 
is constructed as [(Q2x76 + Q3x92+ Q4*15)/182], where Q2 is the FFA price for the 2nd quarter 
of 2010, Q3 is the FFA price for the 3rd quarter of 2010, and Q4 is the FFA price for the 4th 
quarter of 2010.4   
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the FFA and TC time series data along with the 
differential (spread) between them.  We note that the average TC rate is higher than the average 
FFA price across contract durations and vessel sizes, which could be taken as an early indication 
of a physical convenience yield, particularly as our sample includes the 2003 – 2008 period of 
unusually strong freight markets and high fleet utilization.  Conversely, we cannot rule out that 
such a differential represents a risk premium, compensating, for instance, for the higher default 
risk inherent in a bilateral TC contract. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Historical time-charter rates and FFA equivalent prices for 6- and 12-month periods along with 
the differential between the two rates are presented in Figures 1 to 3 for Capesize, Panamax and 
Supramax dry bulk carriers, respectively.  We can see that the physical TC rates and FFA prices 
for the 6- and 12-month periods are closely aligned and move together over the long run across 
                                                 
4 We acknowledge that it may not be easy to replicate the portfolio of FFA contracts needed to exactly match the 
duration of a time-charter, particularly if the latter includes an extension option.  There are two reasons for this.  
Firstly, while the minimum trade size in the FFA market is theoretically one day per month, actual trading will 
typically occur in multiples of 5 days.  Secondly, it is generally not possible to trade a monthly contract that is in 
settlement beyond about the 20th day of the month, which may exclude certain contracts from the portfolio in 
practice.  Nevertheless, we believe that our FFA-equivalent prices are representative of the implied pricing of fixed-
duration contracts in the market. 
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all three vessel sizes, albeit with short-run deviations. In addition, the plot of the differential 
between the two prices seems to be highly mean reverting, relatively volatile and on average 
positive, for both 6- and 12-month period and across all vessel categories. The highest levels of 
the TC-FFA differentials and their volatilities can be observed over the period 2007 to 2008, 
when dry bulk freight rates were at their historical highs 
Insert Figure 1 
Insert Figure 2 
Insert Figure 3 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for our TC fixture data and the FFA price for the 
corresponding charter duration.  We also include the standard vessel specifications for the “Baltic 
type” vessel underlying the spot indices on which the FFAs are settled for comparison.  Again, 
the average TC rate in the physical market is higher than the corresponding FFA price across 
vessel sizes.  At the same time, we can observe that the technical specifications of the vessels 
fixed in the TC market are, on average, very similar to the standard “Baltic type” vessel.  
Consequently, physical basis risk due to vessel specifications appears an unlikely candidate to 
explain the differential. 
Insert Table 2 
5. Empirical results 
We begin the empirical analysis by first investigating the short and long run relation between 
physical TC and FFA-equivalent rates, using the Johansen (1988) cointegration approach. 
Establishing the cointegration relation between the TC and FFA is important because it would 
confirm that both variables are driven by the same underlying factor in the long run and deviate 
from the long run equilibrium, in short periods of time, due to factors that affect each variable 
differently – e.g. vessel shortages in the physical market, default risk etc. The results of the 
Johansen test for the cointegration relation between TC rates and FFA equivalents for 6- and 12-
month periods across the three dry bulk vessel classes are presented in Table 3. The appropriate 
lag length (=2) for the VECM model is selected by the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion. 
Both trace and max statistics suggest that there is one cointegration relation linking the 
physical TC and FFA rates across all vessel sizes and contract duration. The Likelihood Ratio 
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tests on the full restriction set on cointegrating vector )0   1    1( 021   seem to be 
rejected across all vessel sizes and maturities. However, the second restriction which only 
implies a one-to-one movement between the TC and FFA )   1    1( 021    with a non-zero 
spread between the two series seems to be valid at the 5% significance level for all maturities 
and vessel sizes, except the 12-month TC and FFA for Panamax vessels, where the restriction is 
valid at the 1% significant level. Therefore, the results of the cointegration and restriction tests 
reveal that while the TC and FFAs are cointegrated and move close to each other in the long run, 
there nonetheless seems to be a significant differential (premium) between the two rates. The 
negative sign of the estimated coefficients of the constant in the cointegrating vector suggest that 
physical TC rates carry a statistically significant premium over the equivalent FFA rates across 
all vessel types and both the 6 and 12-month maturities5. 
Insert Table 3 
The estimation results of the VECM models for physical TC and FFA rates for different size dry 
bulk carriers are reported in Table 4. Overall, it seems that FFA rates have greater explanatory 
power over physical TC rates than the other way around, as indicated by the significance of 
lagged FFA rates in most of the TC equations. This is also evident from the higher R-bar-squared 
of the TC equations compared to the FFA equations.  The results of the Granger-Causality tests 
between TC and FFA equivalents, also reported in Table 4, reveal that while there is a 
unidirectional causality from FFA rates to physical TC in the Capesize and Panamax markets, 
there is a bi-directional causality between TC and FFA rates in the Supramax market. 
Insert Table 4 
Having established that the physical TC and FFA rates are cointegrated, we proceed to examine 
the determinants of the TC premium at the macro level, where we consider only the dynamics of 
the differential on a time series basis (Equation 3).  From Table 5 we see that the TC-FFA 
differentials in the Capesize, Panamax and Supramax tend to follow an ARMA-X(2,2-3) process, 
                                                 
5 To assess whether the cointegration relations between TC and FFA-equivalent rates in different sectors are stable 
and not affected by structural changes, we also performed the cointegration analysis and imposed parameters 
restrictions before and after the October 2008 financial crisis across all the sectors (Capesize, Panamax and 
Supramax). The results, which are not reported here but available from the authors, confirm that the cointegration 
relations between TC and FFA hold in both sub-periods and the results of the parameter restrictions are also 
consistent before and after the financial crisis, suggesting that the cointegration relation between TC and FFA-
equivalents are stable and robust to possible structural change.     
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while the 12 month TC-FFA differential for Supramax seem to follow ARMA-X(2,0) process.  
The AR coefficients suggest that the differential is mean reverting towards a level which is 
governed by the level and slope of the physical term structure.  Importantly, the coefficients of 
the log TC rates are positive and highly significant, which indicate that the TC-FFA differential 
is directly related to the level of freight rates in the market.  For instance, in the Capesize segment, 
the estimated coefficient of lTCt  (0.231) indicates that – everything else being equal - for every 
$1000/day increase in physical freight rate, the TC-FFA differential  widens by $231/day.  
Moreover, the estimated coefficient of market default probability (DEF) is positive and 
significant in all equations, except for 6-month contract for Panamax vessels, which suggests 
that the differential is positively related to the market condition and default risk. Therefore, the 
empirical results support the notion that there must exist a positive and time-varying differential 
across all vessel sizes and TC durations.  The observation that the premium is increasing with 
the level of the TC rate is also aligned with both the convenience yield and risk premium 
hypotheses.  On the one hand, the physical contract provides secure access to transportation 
through the commercial control of a vessel, and this has greater value during times of high fleet 
utilization and high rates.  On the other hand, Adland and Jia (2008) show that the risk premium 
due to default risk in bilateral TC contracts is increasing with the level of TC rates, a risk which 
does not exist for FFA contracts which are traded through a clearing house.  It follows that the 
observed increase in the TC-FFA premium during strong markets may also be compensation for 
higher risk in the contractual structure of a time-charter.  We note that it is generally not possible 
to disentangle the competing ‘risk premium’ and ‘convenience yield’ hypotheses in empirical 
work.  Indeed, an alternative view of convenience yield is that it is simply a premium for the 
guaranteed physical access to a good, in this case sea transportation.  The alternative - reliance 
on the spot market but hedging market risk with FFAs – comes with a risk of transportation 
shortage for a charterer. 
Table 6 shows the estimated relationship between the observed differential for individual fixtures 
and the vessel-specific, contract-specific terms and market conditions.  The models are estimated 
using the Ordinary Least Squares method and standard errors are corrected for the presence of 
heteroscedasticity. The reported adjusted R2 of 52.7%, 28.8% and 33.1% for the Capesize, 
Panamax and Supramax markets, respectively, indicate that up to 50% of the variation of the 
TC-FFA differential for individual contracts can be explained by the factors considered. The 
estimated coefficients of the vessel-specific factors (age, size, speed and consumption) are 
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generally significant and have the expected signs.  For instance, the relationship between vessel 
age and the TC-FFA differential is nonlinear such that modern vessels (younger than 
approximately 13 years of age) command a TC premium while older vessels must accept a 
discount.  This is in line with earlier empirical results in the literature on fixture data analysis 
(see, for instance, Alizadeh and Talley, 2011a and b; Adland et al, 2016; and Adland et al, 2017).  
Greater capacity (DWT) has the expected positive and significant impact on the TC-FFA 
differential and reflects the impact of differing vessel specifications between the time-chartered 
vessel and the “Baltic type” vessel underlying FFA pricing.  Similarly, higher fuel consumption 
has a negative impact on the TC rate and therefore the differential, whereas higher speed tends 
to increase the TC-FFA differential.  
The reported estimated coefficients of contract terms (duration, days to laycan, delivery location 
and extension option) are also significant and carry the expected signs. For instance, Pacific and 
Indian Ocean delivery obtains lower TC rates (and therefore a lower differential) than the 
benchmark Atlantic delivery, as expected.  The estimated coefficient for the extension option 
dummy is positive and significant only in the Panamax market, where the coefficient of the TC 
contract duration is also significant but negative. 
In relation to the estimated coefficient of variables representing market condition, the slope of 
forward curve is negative and significant for Supramax, but positive and significant in the 
Panamax model and negative and insignificant in the Capeszie model.  The negative relation 
between the slope of FFA curve and the TC-FFA differential indicate that when the FFA market 
is in backwardation (i.e. high spot rates), there is a greater risk of a shortage of vessels and so 
having physical access to ships carries a premium (the convenience yield explanation). Similarly, 
a backwardated forward curve can be an indication of expected market decline and, hence, an 
increase in default risks and higher default premia in the TC market. The estimated coefficient 
of the default probability (DEF) is positive and significant only in the Capesize model, and it is 
insignificant in both Panamax and Supramax  models. While the results for the Capesize model 
is in line with what was found in the aggregate market analysis (Table 5), the results of the 
Panamax and Supramax equations suggest that default probability may not be an important factor 
in determination of TC-FFA differential in the market for smaller vessels. The estimated 
coefficient for the fuel price is positive and significant across all models, which indicates that 
increase in fuel prices tend to widen the TC-FFA differential. This can be attributed to the fact 
that higher oil (and bunker) prices is an indication of increase in demand for oil and other 
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commodities during the market recovery which in turn increase demand for transportation, 
freight rates and TC-FFA differentials.  
 
6. Implications for freight trading and hedging 
One practical and important implication of the results in this paper relates to the pricing of TC 
contracts. Theoretically, the price of TC contracts is a function of current and expected spot 
market rates, expected fuel prices and future market conditions (see Kavussanos and Alizadeh, 
2002). In practice, however, market participants may use the FFA curve to assess and price a TC 
contract with some adjustment due to the contract and vessel specifications. Our model and 
estimated coefficients can be used to evaluate period contracts for a given forward curve (FFA 
equivalent), as well as contract specifics and vessel particulars. For instance, based on the 
estimated coefficients of the model in equation (4), Table 7 reports the calculated values of a 12-
month TC contract for three 5-year old Capesize vessels of 180,000dwt, 172,000dwt and 
150,000dwt, with delivery options in the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans, and the FFA equivalent 
level of $10,000/day6.  The table shows that the 12-month TC premia over the FFA equivalent 
can be as much as 16.9% for a 5-year old 180,000dwt Capesize delivered in the Atlantic Ocean, 
whereas the same vessel should earn 2.6% more than FFA equivalent if delivered in the Pacific. 
Similarly, a 5-year old 150,000dwt Capesize should earn 1.8% more than the FFA equivalent on 
a 12-month TC when delivered in the Atlantic, while the same vessel will earn 10.6% less than 
the FFA equivalent ($10,000/day) if delivered in the Pacific.  In addition, changes in market 
conditions, as proxied by the default probability (DEF), can affect the differential between TC 
and FFA contracts. For instance, in the case of the 180,000dwt Capesize vessel delivered in the 
Atlantic, a change of DEF from 1% to 2% results in an increase of $240/day ($11,690/day to 
$11,930/day) or 2.03% in the TC rate premium due to higher default probability. 
Based on the observation that the TC-FFA differential is generally positive and can widen to 
high levels in the short run (ref. Figures 1 to 3), it is tempting to conclude that there must exist 
some trading strategy that can take advantage of its dynamics by ‘arbitraging’ the physical and 
‘paper’ markets. If the market is efficient, this would of course not be the case, as any apparent 
                                                 
6 Other vessel and contracts specific factors are kept constant including speed of 14knots, consumption of 50mt/day, 
contract period of 12 months, forward delivery period of 20 days, option to extend, 10% slope of the forward curve, 
default premium (DEF) of 1%, and fuel prices of $350/tonne. 
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gains would simply be compensation for risk – both physical basis risk (i.e. differences in vessel 
specifications, contractual terms and cash flow timing) and default or liquidity risk. Nevertheless, 
as an illustration of the potential gains from following such an approach in the three vessel 
segments, we consider the following simple trading strategy. If the TC-FFA differential is 
positive on any given day, the ship-operator charters in a vessel on an index-linked TC (duration 
6 or 12 months), charters it out on a fixed-rate TC and buys the FFA portfolio of equal duration. 
We note here that the cash flow from buying a FFA contract is equivalent to the Baltic spot index 
less the agreed FFA price. As a result, the two index-linked cash flows cancel out, and we are 
left with the TC-FFA price differential. Conversely, if the TC-FFA differential is negative on a 
given day, the operator enters the reverse contractual setup (selling FFA, chartering in on a fixed-
rate TC and subletting on a spot index-linked TC, all with the same duration). The cumulative 
profit from such a freight trading strategy is simply the sum of the absolute value of all daily TC-
FFA differentials7, as shown in Figure 4 below since 1st January 2006 for 6-month and 12-month 
contracts in the Capesize, Panamax and Supramax segments, respectively. 
Figure 4 
There are a few takeaways from Figure 4. Firstly, most of the profit would have occurred in the 
12 months prior to the onset of the financial crisis at the end of 2008, when the dry bulk market 
reached records both in terms of freight rate levels and volatility. This is consistent with the 
theoretical explanation that the observed differential is a compensation for risk as well as a 
premium reflecting the value of securing physical transportation. Secondly, the differential is 
generally higher for 6-month contracts than for 12-month contracts, suggesting that there are risk 
factors other than default risk at play here. Thirdly, the risk premium is greater for the larger 
vessel size (Capesize), which is consistent with the well-known greater operational leverage and 
volatility of larger vessel (Kavussanos, 1996). In the period with lower volatility and lower 
freight rates since 2009 the gains from harvesting such risk premia have largely disappeared, 
reflecting the general oversupply in the market. We note that “index linked” physical time-
charter contracts are a relatively recent invention, such that the above trading strategy could not 
have been implemented throughout our sample8. 
                                                 
7 For the purpose of illustration, we can either assume that one new vessel or a fractional vessel (1/365th or 1/183rd) 
enters into this contractual structure every week. Here we have assumed the latter. 
8 It may also be the case that shipowners demand a premium to the index in such charters such that the apparent 
profit is reduced. 
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Finally, turning to hedging applications, the results of this study could be important for freight 
risk management using FFA contracts. In this respect, ship-owners and charterers can use the 
estimated coefficients of the models to adjust the hedge ratio according to factors such as vessel 
size, age, delivery location, etc. to achieve a more effective hedge. For instance, the estimated 
coefficient of vessel size can be used to adjust the hedge ratio of the FFA position according to 
the vessel’s DWT compared to the standard vessel underlying FFA contracts. The estimated 
coefficients of dwt in model (4) indicates that, all else equal, every 1000 DWT in vessel size 
above the Baltic standard vessel will increase the physical earnings of the ship by 0.46%, 0.63% 
and 1.40% above the FFA rate in the Capesize, Panamax and Supramax markets, respectively. 
Therefore, the hedgers must increase their FFA position accordingly to establish a full cover for 
risk for the given vessel size. Similarly, the estimated coefficients of the Pacific Ocean delivery 
dummy suggest that, everything else being equal, vessels delivered in the Pacific tend to earn 
13.02% (Capesize), 11.40% (Panamax) and 15.36% (Supramax) less than vessels delivered in 
the Atlantic relative to the FFA rate for the standard vessel. Hence, the ship-owners and 
charterers should consider adjusting the FFA positions accordingly to avoid over- or under-
hedging. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have argued, from a theoretical point of view, that there should be a positive and 
time-varying differential between forward rates in the physical freight and freight derivative 
markets that is positively related to the state of the freight market.  We show that TC rates and 
FFA prices are co-integrated and that the resulting price differential can be well described by an 
ARMA-X model where the linear terms (X) includes the state of the freight market and the slope 
of the term structure of freight rates.  We repeat the investigation for individual fixtures in the 
TC market and show that vessel-specific and contract-specific variables (as a proxy for basis risk 
due to technical specifications) also act as determinants at the micro level, with the expected 
results. We point to two explanations for the presence of such a premium: 1) it is a compensation 
for known risks inherent in bilateral physical TC contracts such as default risk and 2) it is a 
convenience yield, as only the physical contract gives access to transportation.   
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Our work is an important first step in the evaluation of the determinants of the observed price 
differentials between the physical forward market and financial freight derivative market.  
However, the findings also have practical implications for risk management and operations in 
bulk shipping.  Most importantly, we point to the possibility out that apparent ‘arbitrage’ 
opportunities between the two markets – which ship-operators will often claim to be able to take 
advantage of – may not actually exist once the differences in risks, vessel specifications and 
contractual terms are properly accounted for.  Secondly, our proposed methodology enables risk 
managers to adjust physical TC rates and FFA prices for differences in periods, vessel 
characteristics and contract terms so as to better compare the true cost of hedging with the two 
alternatives. 
Future research should dig deeper into the important issue of whether the magnitude of the 
observed time-varying differentials is consistent with likely compensation for risk, for instance 
along the lines of the model for default risk presented in Adland and Jia (2008).  It would also 
be interesting to develop more complicated trading strategies for ship-operators based on the 
observed time-varying differentials. 
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Table 1– Time series descriptive statistics 
 Mean Std.Dev J-B  LB-Q (13) PP Test 
Level 
PP test 
changes 
Capesize       
6 Month TC 40971 44275 569.18 6587.3 -1.939 -22.341 
6 Month FFA 35720 40229 596.38 6560.8 -2.002 -29.612 
6 Month Spread 5251 6387 5886.22 1619.2 -12.66  
12 Month TC 37907 40206 610.75 66.74.0 -1.800 -24.002 
12 Month FFA 33770 36528 590.17 6675.8 -1.894 -30.254 
12 Month Spread 4138 5445 13699.95 1965.3 -9.895  
Slope 0.0185 0.4430 130.18 2469.2 -4.921  
Panamax       
6 Month TC 23308 16500 464.27 6703.9 -1.840 -23.741 
6 Month FFA 20150 12812 492.46 6722.7 -1.808 -28.842 
6 Month Spread 3159 2613 891.66 2688.7 -11.273  
12 Month TC 21133 14500 544.97 6828.6 -1.785 -25.668 
12 Month FFA 19202 12657 500.48 6772.7 -1.722 -30.018 
12 Month Spread 1931 1378 3090.14 2515.7 -11.983  
Slope 0.0123 0.2578 257.87 3011.3 -4.717  
Supramax       
6 Month TC 20469 14250 464.27 6573.4 -1.730 -16.972 
6 Month FFA 18391 12498 492.46 6613.4 -1.666 -27.530 
6 Month Spread 2078 1682 891.66 1973.0 -11.005  
12 Month TC 18905 13000 544.97 6666.8 -1.606 -14.183 
12 Month FFA 17539 12391 500.48 6653.3 -1.593 -28.433 
12 Month Spread 1366 805 3090.14 2939.6 -9.679  
Slope -0.0585 0.1718 127.25 2561.3 -4.645  
Market Stress Index -0.3820 1.1472 1163.5 6582.2 -1.724  
• Sample period is from 22 July 2005 to 23 December 2016, a total of 597 weekly observations for Capesize 
and Panamax and from 1 January 2006 to 23 December 2016, a total of 580 weekly observations for 
Supramax vessels.  
• S.D. is the standard deviation. JB test is the Jarque-Bera (1980) test for Normality. The test follows a 2 
distribution with 2 degrees of freedom.  
• LB-Q(13) is Ljung-Box (1978) tests for 13th order autocorrelation in the level of series. 1%, 5% and 10% 
critical values for this test are –3.9739, -3.4175 and –3.1308, respectively. 
• PP test is the Philips and Perron (1988) unit root tests. 1%, 5% and 10% critical values for this test are –
3.9739, -3.4175 and –3.1308, respectively. 
• Slope is defined as the log of Current Quarter (CQ) over near Calendar (Cal+1) FFA contracts for each 
vessel size. 
• Market Stress Index is the index published by Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, representing the stress 
in financial markets and used as a proxy for world economic condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2– Descriptive statistics of time-charter fixtures, vessel specifications and contract variables 
   Capesize   Panamax   Supramax  
   Mean StDev No Obs Baltic*  Mean StDev No Obs Baltic  Mean StDev No Obs Baltic 
Contract Rate   $/day  49,505 44,274 765   30,216  22,151  2901   23,311 16,206 1141  
FFA equivalent $/day  49,919 44,157 765   28,845   21,179  2901   22,536 15,766 1141  
Dwt mt  169,878 11,881 765 172000  74,902     3,919  2901 74000  5,225 4,439 1141 52454 
Age Year  8.0 6.10 765 Max 10  8.1 5.2 2901 Max 12  6.4 5.1 1141 Max 15 
Speed knts  14.32 0.70 765 14.75  14.09 0.61 2901 14.0  14.20 0.54 1141 14.25 
Consumption Mt/d  56.59 7.31 765 56  33.57 3.58 2901 30  30.15 3.22 1141 30 
Period months  7.73 3.31 765   6.59 2.93 2901   6.31 3.10 1141  
Laycan days  14.70 28.54 765   9.44 13.86 2901   7.31 13.87 1141  
Pacific Del Dummy   0.86 0.34 765   0.71 0.46 2901   0.60 0.49 1141  
Ind Ocean Del Dummy   0.01 0.11 765   0.08 0.27 2901   0.13 0.33 1141  
Atlantic Del Dummy   0.11 0.31 765   0.20 0.40 2901   0.26 0.44 1141  
Option Dummy   0.85 0.36 765   0.91 0.29 2901   0.82 0.38 1141  
• Sample period is from 22 July 2005 to 23 December 2016, for Capesize and Panamax and from 1 January 2006 to 23 December 2016, for Supramax vessels.  
• *From Baltic Exchange (2014) Manual for Panellists. Speed is average of ballast and laden. 
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Table 3– Results of Cointegration tests between 6- and 12-month Time-charter rates and equivalent FFA rates for different size dry bulk ships 
• Sample period is from 22 July 2005 to 23 December 2016, a total of 597 weekly observations for Capesize and Panamax and from 1 January 2006 to 23 December 2016, a total 
of 570 weekly observations for Supramax vessels.  
• Cointegration tests are based on the Johansen (1988) procedure; the LR test is based on 1% significance level. 
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  Lags H0 H1 trace max  
Normalised CV 
(1      2      0) 
LR test 
2=-1 , 0=0 
LR test 
2=-1 
Capesize          
12month TC-FFA  2 r = 0 r>0 49.406 47.698 (1  -0.979  -0.339) 37.220 2.739 
   r = 1 r>1 1.708 1.708  (0.000) (0.098) 
6month TC-FFA  2 r = 0 r>0 50.736 48.235 (1  -0.964  -0.528) 31.731 3.204 
   r =1 r>1 2.502 2.502  (0.000) (0.074) 
Panamax          
12month TC-FFA  2 r = 0 r>0 38.488 36.910 (1  -0.959  -0.507) 27.098 5.364 
   r = 1 r>1 1.578 1.578  (0.000) (0.021) 
6month TC-FFA  2 r = 0 r>0 30.178 28.100 (1  -0.963  -0.530) 21.268 2.102 
   r =1 r>1 2.078 2.078  (0.000) (0.157) 
Supramax          
12month TC-FFA  2 r = 0 r>0 73.402 71.950 (1  -1.027  0.199) 48.058 9.588 
   r = 1 r>1 1.452 1.452  (0.000) (0.002) 
6month TC-FFA  2 r = 0 r>0 39.480 37.649 (1  -0.992  -0.191) 26.189 0.184 
   r = 1 r>1 1.831 1.831  (0.000) (0.668) 
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Table 4: Results of VECM for Physical Time-charter and FFA equivalent for different size dry bulk carriers 
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 Capesize  Panamax  Supramax 
 6-month  12-month  6-month  12-month  6-month  12-month 
 tct ffat  tct ffat  tct ffat  tct ffat  tct ffat  tct ffat 
ECTt-1 -0.182*** -0.001  -0.191*** 0.012  -0.089*** 0.016  -0.111*** 0.004  -0.112*** 0.048  -0.191*** 0.098* 
 (0.034) (0.035)  (0.043) (0.048)  (0.024) (0.032)  (0.025) (0.035)  (0.024) (0.035)  (0.033) (0.052) 
                  
tct-1 -0.001 0.114**  -0.108* 0.049  -0.066 -0.033  -0.068 -0.081  0.093** 0.179***  0.187*** 0.281*** 
 (0.052) (0.055)  (0.059) (0.067)  (0.053) (0.069)  (0.051) (0.072)  (0.046) (0.066)  (0.049) (0.078) 
                  
tct-2 -0.012 0.004  0.022 0.059  0.004 0.029  0.139 0.164***  0.064 0.062  0.095** 0.110* 
 (0.047) (0.049)  (0.053) (0.060)  (0.043) (0.056)  (0.044) (0.062)  (0.040) (0.057)  (0.041) (0.066) 
                  
ffat-1 0.241*** -0.090  0.204*** -0.087  0.398*** -0.005  0.273*** -0.055  0.300*** -0.050  0.141*** -0.108* 
 (0.055) (0.057)  (0.058) (0.067)  (0.044) (0.058)  (0.041) (0.058)  (0.037) (0.054)  (0.040) (0.063) 
                  
ffat-2 0.219*** 0.137**  0.219*** 0.143***  0.187*** 0.130**  0.120*** 0.120**  0.187*** 0.060  0.063* 0.053 
 (0.052) (0.055)  (0.054) (0.061)  (0.044) (0.058)  (0.040) (0.056)  (0.037) (0.053)  (0.035) (0.056) 
R-bar-sq 0.177 0.033  0.144 0.037  0.271 0.018  0.232 0.049  0.351 0.047  0.327 0.077 
Log-Likelihood 1081.666  1482.99  1598.18  1832.45  1784.69  2039.96 
SBIC -3.581  -4.862  -5.595  -6.092  -6.117  -7.013 
LB-Q(8) 30.818   [0.195]  49.180    [0.002]  50.30   [0.002]  44.346   [0.010]  34.503 [098]  56.691   [0.001] 
Granger Causality                  
tct  --> ffat 4.425    [0.109]  1.207      [0.548]  0.507     [0.776]  8.460    [0.015]  9.094   [0.011]  17.056     [0.000] 
ffat --> tct 26.742   [0.000]  20.170    [0.000]  82.776    [0.000]  43.698     [0.000]  68.919   [0.000]  12.719      [0.000] 
• Figures in () and [] are standard errors and p-values, respectively.  
Table 5– Determinants of physical TC premium (macro level) 
𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑇𝐶𝑡
𝑘 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑡 +∑𝛾𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑡
𝑝
𝑖=1
+∑𝛿𝑗𝜀𝑡−𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝑡 
 
  Capesize  Panamax  Supramax 
Coefficient  6-Month 12-Month  6-Month 12-Month  6-Month 12-Month 
β0    Constant  -4.520*** -2.257***  -2.722*** -1.937***  -3.534*** -0.290*** 
  (0.585) (0.575)  (0.547) (0.669)  (0.955) (0.092) 
          
β1    (lnTC)  0.434*** 0.231***  0.288*** 0.218***  0.358*** 0.033*** 
  (0.046) (0.050)  (0.055) (0.061)  (0.100) (0.009) 
          
β2    (Slope)  0.073** 0.032*  -0.020 -0.101**  -0.039 -0.101*** 
  (0.029) (0.018)  (0.049) (0.039)  (0.091) (0.031) 
          
β3     (DEF)  0.159*** 0.081***  0.061 0.061*  0.099*** 0.011* 
  (0.056) (0.031)  (0.039) (0.035)  (0.036) (0.006) 
          
1  0.630*** 0.555***  0.598*** 0.605***  0.615*** 0.465*** 
  (0.065) (0.059)  (0.060) (0.060)  (0.084) (0.070) 
          
2  0.363*** 0.440***  0.392*** 0.389***  0.378*** 0.174** 
  (0.065) (0.060)  (0.059) (0.058)  (0.079) (0.074) 
          
2  -0.103* -0.249***  -0.195*** -0.199***  -0.203***  
  (0.061) (0.078)  (0.049) (0.066)  (0.047)  
          
3  -0.107** -0.158**  -0.122** -0.113*  -0.102*  
  (0.055) (0.065)  (0.054) (0.064)  (0.060)  
          
No Observations  596 596  589 589  571 571 
R-Bar-Squared  0.659 0.525  0.697 0.659  0.615 0.442 
SBIC  -1.953 -2.638  -2.640 -2.970  -2.909 -3.264 
LB-Q(13)  12.660 9.688  11.137 9.643  9.194 10.044 
  [0.179] [0.376]  [0.266] [0.380]  [0.420] [0.526] 
BPG Test  40.837 14.499  62.233 44.792  38.409 20.849 
  [0.000] [0.002]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] 
• Sample period is from 8 May 2005 to 23 December 2016 for Capesize, from 22 July 2005 to 23 December 
2016 for Panamax and from 16 September 2005 to 23 December 2016 for Supramax vessels.  
• The order of AR and MA terms are selected to eliminate autocorrelation in residuals.  
• Figures in () and [] are standard errors and p-values, respectively. *, **, and ***.indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
• SBIC is the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion, LB-Q(13) is Ljung-Box (1978) test for 13th order 
residuals autocorrelation, and BPG Test is the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroskedasticity. 
• Estimation method is Conditional Least Squares (CLS) and standard errors are corrected using Newey-
West (1987) method where necessary. 
 
  
Table 6– Determinants of physical TC premium (micro level) 
𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑡,𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖
2 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑊𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖 + 𝛾1𝑇𝐶𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾2𝐿𝐶𝑖 
+𝛾3𝑂𝑃𝑖 + 𝛾4𝑃𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾5𝐼𝐷𝑖 + 𝜆1𝑆𝐿𝑡 + 𝜆2𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑡 + 𝜆3𝐵𝑃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡,𝑖 
 
  Capesize  Panamax  Supramax 
β0                   Constant  -1.3584***  -0.5926***  -1.1112*** 
  (0.1884)  (0.1217)  (0.2692) 
β1                             AGE  0.0143***  0.0100***  0.0112*** 
  (0.0036)  (0.0016)  (0.0025) 
β2                             AGE^2  -0.0012***  -0.0008***  -0.0008*** 
  (0.0002)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
β3                             DWT/1000  0.0046***  0.0063***  0.0140*** 
  (0.0005)  (0.0012)  (0.0021) 
β4                             SPEED  0.0212***  0.0049  0.0163 
  (0.0115)  (0.0054)  (0.0159) 
β5                             Consumption  -0.0004*  -0.0008  -0.0032** 
  (0.0003)  (0.0008)  (0.0016) 
1                   TC Duration  -0.0015  -0.0075***  -0.0002 
  (0.0019)  (0.0012)  (0.0005) 
2                   Time to Laycan  -0.0008***  -0.0013***  -0.0035 
  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0022) 
3                            Option Dummy  0.0039  0.0189**  -0.0231 
  (0.0190)  (0.0086)  (0.0166) 
4                             Pacific Ocean Del  -0.1302***  -0.1140***  -0.1536*** 
  (0.0161)  (0.0101)  (0.0151) 
5                             Indian Ocean Del  -0.1312***  -0.0688***  -0.1450*** 
  (0.0470)  (0.0117)  (0.0162) 
1                  Slope of FWD   -0.0179  0.0594***  -0.1672*** 
  (0.0149)  (0.0180)  (0.0309) 
2                            Default Premium  0.0203**  0.00002  -0.0045 
  (0.0090)  (0.0050)  (0.0064) 
3                             Log of fuel price  0.0653***  0.0413***  0.0658*** 
  (0.0170)  (0.0124)  (0.0164) 
       
       
No Observations  685  2920  1149 
R-Bar-Squared  0.527  0.298  0.331 
SBIC  -1.0844  -1.4491  -1.1906 
LM Test  12.558  245.48  68.537 
  [0.002]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
BPG Test  62.853  480.48  137.79 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
• Sample period is from 22 July 2005 to 23 December 2016, a total of 685 observations for Capesize, and 
2901 for Panamax, and from 1 January 2006 to 23 December 2016, a total of 1149 weekly observations 
for Supramax vessels.  
• Figures in () and [] are standard errors and p-values, respectively. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
• SBIC is the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion, LM Test is the Lagrange Multiplier test tests for serial 
correlation in residuals and White Test is the White (1980) test for heteroscedasticity. 
• Standard errors are corrected for the presence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation using Newey 
and West (1987) methods. 
 
29 
 
Table 7– Valuation of time-charter rates for Capesize vessels based on vessel and contract 
specific factors and FFA curve 
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   Atlantic Delivery  Pacific Delivery 
FFA equivalent  $/day   10,000 10,000 10,000  10,000 10,000 10,000 
Constant -1.4394     
    
AGE (years) 0.0143  5 5 5 
 5 5 5 
AGE2 -0.0012  25 25 25 
 25 25 25 
DWT/1000 0.0048  180000 172000 150000 
 180000 172000 150000 
Speed 0.0243  14 14 14 
 14 14 14 
Consumption -0.0004  50 50 50 
 50 50 50 
TC Period -0.0007  12 12 12 
 12 12 12 
Forward Days -0.0009  20 20 20 
 20 20 20 
Ext Option Dummy 0.0098  1 1 1 
 1 1 1 
Pacific Delivery Dummy -0.1236  0 0 0 
 1 1 1 
Indian Ocean Delivery Dummy -0.1281  0 0 0 
 0 0 0 
Slope of Forward curve -0.0291  0.1 0.1 0.1 
 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Default Premium 0.0093  1 1 1 
 1 1 1 
Log(Fuel Price) 0.0729  350 350 350 
 350 350 350 
      
    
Estimated Time Charter $/day   11,690 11,268 10,183  10,263 9,892 8,940 
TC Premium over FFA   16.9% 12.7% 1.8%  2.6% -1.1% -10.6% 
• The table uses the estimation results of equation (4), presented in Table 6, to illustrate the valuation of time-charter 
contracts using forward curve, vessel specific factors, contracts terms, and market conditions. 
 
Figure 1: Capesize Time-Charter rate and FFA Equivalents 
6-month TC and FFA equivalent  12-month TC and FFA equivalent  
  
Spread between 6-month TC and FFA  Spread between 12-month TC and FFA 
  
  
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
U
S$
/d
ay
TC_6M FFA_eqv
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
180,000
200,000
U
S$
/D
ay
TC_12M FFA_Eqv
-20000
-10000
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
U
S$
/d
ay
Spread_6Month
-20000
-10000
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
U
S$
/D
ay
Spread_12M
31 
 
Figure 2: Panamax Time-Charter rate and FFA Equivalents 
6-month TC and FFA equivalent  12-month TC and FFA equivalent  
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Figure 3: Supramax Time-Charter rate and FFA Equivalents 
6-month TC and FFA equivalent  12-month TC and FFA equivalent  
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Figure 4: Cumulative profit from simple trading strategy 
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